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Abstract
Economic reforms in rural China have stimulated the development of land and labour markets. The 
increasing importance of these two markets suggests that they might be closely inter-related, but proper 
statistical tests are lacking. This paper examines the factors that determine the participation of farm 
households in land renting and migration, and investigates whether participation in land renting and 
migration influence each other, using a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit regression. Data from a 
household survey held in 2000 in three villages in the north-east of the Jiangxi Province were used to 
estimate the land renting and migration equations. Household characteristics, fixed factors, household 
land and labour endowments, institutional factors, and land and labour prices were used as explanatory 
variables in both equations. We found that the error terms of the land renting equation and the 
migration equation were strongly correlated, confirming that there is a negative relationship between 
land renting and migration. 
Additional keywords: bivariate probit model, household model, market imperfection, seemingly unrelated 
regression 
Introduction
The development of land rental markets plays an important role in improving 
agricultural productivity and rural household incomes (Faruqee & Carey, 1997; Carter 
& Olinto, 1998; Deininger & Feder, 2001; Carter & Yao, 1999, 2002; Deininger, 
2003; Deininger & Zegarra, 2003; Deininger et al., 2003; Deininger & Jin, 2005; Yao, 
2007). It does so through several mechanisms. First, a land rental market allows the 
marginal product of land to be equalized across households with different land–labour 
endowments and thus increases allocative efficiency. Second, a land rental market 
allows households that have a comparative advantage in agricultural production or 
off-farm employment to specialize, and hence boosts both farm and off-farm incomes. 
Third, a land rental market increases households’ investment incentives because 
households can reap the benefits through higher rental prices if they choose to 
participate in off-farm employment in the future.
 The development of off-farm employment also plays an important role in 
improving agricultural productivity and rural household incomes (Rozelle et al., 1999a; 
Reardon et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2003; Anon., 2005a; Wouterse, 2006). First, off-
farm employment can absorb surplus labour from agriculture. Households remaining 
in agriculture can consolidate farmland, extend farming operations and specialize 
in (labour-intensive and high-value) agricultural production and hence increase both 
land and labour productivity. Second, off-farm employment can supplement rural 
household incomes and reduce poverty, thereby increasing households’ investment in 
agricultural inputs and human capital development, especially for those households 
with credit or liquidity constraints. Third, off-farm employment can diversify rural 
household incomes and reduce the income risks of households. 
 The emergence of land and labour markets in China is the result of economic 
reforms. In the past, off-farm employment was constrained by the household 
registration system (hukou) and collective farming. Since the mid-1980s, however, 
it has become a significant phenomenon in rural China. By 2000, more than 200 
million rural labourers worked off-farm (De Brauw et al., 2002; Zhang et al., 2002). 
Whereas the land rental market was thin in the past, surveys of 215 villages in eight 
provinces in 1995 showed that less than 3% of total land was rented (Brandt et al., 
2002; 2004), recent studies show an increasing incidence of land rental activities 
(Lohmar et al., 2001; Kung, 2002; Deininger & Jin, 2005). The fact that both land 
rental market participation and off-farm employment have been rising in recent years 
suggests that these two markets might be closely inter-related. 
 Many studies have analysed labour migration decisions in rural China, either at the 
individual level (Zhao, 1997; 1999a; 2002; 2003; Kung & Lee, 2001; Li & Yao, 2002; 
Zhang et al., 2002; Shi et al., 2007) or at the farm household level (Lohmar, 1999; 
Rozelle et al., 1999a; Zhao, 1999b; Taylor et al., 2003). However, the effect of land 
rental market participation on migration decisions has only been examined by Kung 
& Lee (2001) and Shi et al. (2007). They found that the development of land rental 
markets encouraged off-farm employment, with the land market participation decision 
being exogenously determined in their studies.
 Whereas the development of land rental markets has recently attracted attention, 
empirical analyses of the factors determining land market participation in rural China 
are still rare (Yao, 2000; Lohmar et al., 2001; Kung, 2002; Feng et al., 2004; Zhang et 
al., 2004; Deininger & Jin, 2005). All of these studies included the effect of off-farm 
employment, especially migration, on land rental market participation decisions. 
However, only a few of these studies considered the endogenous character of off-
farm employment decisions (Yao, 2000; Kung, 2002). They all found that off-farm 
employment had a positive effect on households’ land rental market participation 
decisions. 
 However, the estimation of the inter-relationship of land and labour market 
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participation will be biased if household decisions on land and labour market 
participation are jointly determined. Therefore, the effect (if any) that household 
decisions on land rental market participation and off-farm employment have on 
each other remains an unresolved issue. This paper analyses the factors determining 
households’ decisions on land renting and migration, and examines empirically 
whether farm households’ land renting and migration decisions influence each other. 
The insights obtained from this study can provide an important input into the design 
of appropriate policies to improve the functioning of land and labour markets.
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next chapter gives a brief 
description of the study area and data, followed by a description of the recent trends 
in land rental market development and off-farm employment in Jiangxi Province. 
Thereafter the model specification is discussed and the results are presented of a 
seemingly unrelated bivariate probit regression explaining household land renting 
and migration decisions. The paper ends with conclusions and policy implications, 
presented in the last chapter.
Research area and data description
This paper uses data from a farm household survey that was held in three villages in 
the north-east of the Jiangxi Province, located in the south-east of China. Agriculture 
plays an important role in the economy of this province. In 2004, 20.4% of its GDP 
was derived from agriculture, 5.2% more than the average for the whole country. Its 
GDP per capita was 77% of the national average (Anon., 2005b). 
 The villages were selected using a series of criteria including economic 
development level, market access and geographical conditions. Local researchers and 
policy makers were consulted and several site visits were made as part of this process. 
The three villages are considered representative of the diversity of rural conditions 
that can be found in the north-east of the Jiangxi Province and in the much larger hilly 
area of south-east China with rice-based production systems (Kuiper et al., 2001). The 
three villages selected were Banqiao in Yujiang County, Shangzhu in Guixi City and 
Gangyan in Yanshan County. Banqiao is the smallest village, and is located in a hilly 
area. Market access is good, with a major city located within 10 km. Shangzhu is a 
middle-sized village located in a mountainous area. The transport infrastructure is bad. 
It takes about two hours by car from the county capital to the hamlet where the village 
offices are located. Gangyan is the most populous village. It is located in a flat area, 20 
km away from a major market. Road conditions are good. 
 The farm household survey was carried out in 2000 and the beginning of 2001. 
The questions in the survey referred to the entire year of 2000. In each village, 23% of 
the households were interviewed. A stratified random sample was used for selecting 
the households, with the hamlets within each village forming the strata (Kuiper et 
al., 2001). A total of 329 farm households were interviewed, 54 in Banqiao, 108 in 
Shangzhu and 167 in Gangyan. The information collected included demographic 
characteristics, assets, land tenure, and participation in factor markets. 
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Participation in land and labour markets in the north-east 
of the Jiangxi Province
Land rental market
Since the introduction of the household responsibility system (HRS) at the end of the 
1970s, land use rights have been assigned to farm households on the basis of family size, 
labour force, or a combination of both. Land transfers were initially not allowed, because 
policy makers believed that land transfers would lead to a concentration of land with 
a few households, leaving most households landless. Instead, frequent administrative 
reallocations of land by village leaders have been used to correct for changes in the land–
labour ratios of households caused by demographic changes. However, administrative 
reallocations are normally slow, involve high transaction costs, and are possibly subject 
to bureaucratic inefficiencies and rent-seeking behaviour (Johnson, 1995). Owing to the 
absence of a rural social security system, rural households in China consider land as a 
form of social insurance. When households become involved in off-farm employment, 
they do not usually give up their land, giving them the option of returning to farming in 
case of losing their off-farm jobs. Administrative reallocation cannot replace land market 
transfers in solving these problems. 
 Since the mid-1980s, however, the authorities have permitted land rentals. An 
overview of land rental market participation in the three surveyed villages, sub-divided 
into irrigated land and dryland, is presented in Table 1. Renting forestland is negligible 
and therefore not considered in our analysis. Land rental activities are mostly limited 
to irrigated land. Of all the households in the three villages, 46% rented irrigated land, 
whereas only 6% rented dryland. In Banqiao village, the village with a relative large area 
of dryland, 20% of the households rented additional dryland.
 There were large differences between the proportion of households that rented land 
and the proportion of households that leased land, especially for irrigated land. Of all the 
households in the sample, 46% rented additional irrigated land, whereas only 8% leased 
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Table 1. Land rental markets for irrigated land (I) and dryland (D) in three villages in 2000.
Village No. of farm Households involved in:
 households  
  Renting  Self-sufficient Leasing  Renting Total
        & leasing
  I D I D I D I D I D
  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   (%)  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Banqiao 54 54 20 35 76 11 2 0 2 100 100
Shangzhu 108 48 3 46 96 6 1 0 0 100 100
Gangyan 167 41 4 48 93 8 2 2 0 100 100
Average  46 6 45 91 8 2 1 0 100 100
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irrigated land. One reason for this large discrepancy may be that those farm households 
that leased their land did so to more than one household at the same time. But part of 
the discrepancy may also have been caused by the fact that some farm households that 
leased their land had migrated, but still retained their land use rights, and could not be 
interviewed during the survey. In addition, some farm households may not have reported 
leasing for fear of losing their land in the next round of land reallocations. 
 A few farm households rented and leased land at the same time. Of all the farm 
households in the three villages, only one rented and leased dryland, whereas four farm 
households rented and leased irrigated land simultaneously.
Labour market
Off-farm employment 
China’s population recently reached 1.3 billion, with about 60% still living in rural 
areas. The average size of landholdings is only around 0.52 ha per family (Anon., 
2005b), which normally cannot fully employ a family’s labour force. Since the early 
1980s, an off-farm economy consisting of jobs in township and village enterprises 
(TVEs) in urban centres and more recently private enterprises has emerged and has 
accelerated its growth since 1995 (De Brauw et al., 2002). 
 Local off-farm employment and migration are the two basic off-farm employment 
categories. Migrants are family members working off-farm and not living together 
with other household members. Households categorized as involved in migration 
have at least one family member working as a migrant. Those classified as involved 
in local off-farm employment have no household members who are involved in off-
farm employment working as migrants. Their impact on household incomes and 
the village economy may differ substantially, because migrants live apart from other 
household members and spend a large share of their earnings outside the village. Local 
off-farm employment includes agricultural wage employment, non-agricultural wage 
employment, and self-employment. Participation in off-farm employment in the three 
villages in 2000 is presented in Table 2. Up to 82% of farm households in the three 
villages participated in off-farm employment in 2000. Migration was relatively more 
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Table 2. Type of off-farm employment in three villages in 2000.
Village No. of farm Off-farm employment
 households
  Local Migration Total
  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   (%)  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Banqiao 54 27 43 70
Shangzu 108 21 52 73
Gangyan 167 19 73 92
Average  21 61 82
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important than local off-farm employment. Of all the households in the three villages, 
21% participated in local off-farm employment and 61% in migration. This difference 
was mainly caused by the much higher participation in migration than in local off-farm 
employment in Gangyan village. As much as 73% of farm households participated 
in migration in Gangyan village, the village where per capita farmland resources are 
scarce while market access is good. The overall participation in off-farm employment 
is also much higher in this village (92%) than in the two other villages (70% and 73%) 
due to a relatively high migration rate.
Agricultural labour demand 
In rural China, agricultural labour markets are found despite the surplus of rural 
labour. They provide mechanisms for labour-constrained farm households to deal 
with labour shortages, especially during peak agricultural seasons. A distinction can 
be made between agricultural wage labour and exchange labour. Exchange of labour 
mainly takes place among relatives and friends, and does not involve payment. Rural 
labour demand for rice production, the most important crop in the three villages, is 
shown in Table 3. Exchange labour was relatively important in these villages. Only 22% 
of the farm households hired additional labour, whereas 40% of the farm households 
used exchange labour in rice production. Both the hiring of agricultural labour and 
exchange of labour were highest in Gangyan village. In this village, migration was also 
the highest.
Household labour demand and supply
A summary of the labour market situation of households in the three villages is 
presented in Table 4. Hiring out labour through off-farm employment without hiring 
in agricultural labour occurred most often (63% of the farm households). Only 2% 
of the farm households hired additional labour for rice production without being 
involved in off-farm employment. Of the remaining households, 15% neither hired in 
nor hired out labour, whereas 19% of the farm households hired labour in and out in 
the same year. This latter finding provides support for the hypothesis that the optimal 
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Table 3. Type of labour demand for rice production in three villages in 2000.
Village No. of farm  Households involved in:
 households 
  Hired Exchange 
  labour labour
  - - - - - - - - - - - -   (%)  - - - - - - - - - - - -
Banqiao 54 15 26
Shangzu 108 15 38
Gangyan 167 29 45
Average  22 40
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permanent labour force should normally be less than the peak labour demand and be 
greater than the slack labour demand (Binswanger & Rosenzweig, 1986). Gangyan 
village had the highest share of farm households that both hired in and out, and also 
had the lowest share of self-sufficient households. This is consistent with the relatively 
high incidence of migration and farm labour hiring in this village. 
Model specification
As discussed in the foregoing, there were large differences between the proportion of 
households that rented land and the proportion of households that leased land: only 
16 households leased land. Missing observations in the data set caused by migrated 
households may bias the estimation results. Based on personal observations in the 
research area, the data for households’ land renting decisions are likely to be more 
precise than the data for land leasing decisions. So we confined our analysis to 
households’ decisions on land renting. A dummy variable was therefore constructed for 
land renting. This variable equalled 1 if the household rented land and 0 otherwise. Off-
farm employment included both local off-farm activities and migration. People involved 
in local off-farm employment live at home. They can combine local off-farm work with 
working on-farm due to the small size of landholdings and the seasonality of agricultural 
production, and are therefore less likely to participate in the land rental market. For 
that reason, we limited the analysis of participation in off-farm activities in our paper 
to migration. A dummy variable for migration was used, which equalled 1 if the 
household was involved in migration and 0 otherwise. Reduced-form equations derived 
from a theoretical model of rural household decision-making presented in Appendix 1 
(Equations 16, 17 and 18) were used to specify the factors that potentially affect household 
decisions on land renting and migration. This gives the following model: 
  R = α0 + α1Zh + α2Zq + α3L + α4A + α5w + α6r + α7Z + ε  (1)
  M = β0 + β1Zh + β2Zq + β3L + β4A + β5w + β6r + β7Z + η  (2)
Table 4. Distribution of labour market participation in three villages in 2000.
Village No. of farm Type of labour participation
 households 
  Hiring in Self-sufficient Hiring out Hiring in Total
     & hiring out
  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   (%)   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Banqiao 54 7 22 63 7 100
Shangzhu 108 3 24 61 12 100
Gangyan 167 1 7 64 28 100
Average  2 15 63 19 100
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where
R  = dummy variable for land renting (= 1 if the household rented land)
M  = dummy variable for migration (= 1 if there was at least one household member 
  involved in migration)
Zh   = a vector of household characteristics 
Zq   = a vector of fixed factors 
L  = household labour endowment 
A  = household land endowment (in mu; 1 mu = 1/15 ha)
w  = wage rate
r  = land rent 
Z  = a vector of institutional factors affecting land renting and migration
α, β = unknown coefficients
ε, η = error terms with standard properties
 It was expected that migration reduced land renting, because it reduces the amount 
of labour available for agricultural production (Yao, 2000; Lohmar et al., 2001; Kung, 
2002; Feng et al., 2004; Zhang et al., 2004). In the research area, land rental activities 
were mainly restricted to irrigated land. Therefore, the analysis of land rental activities 
was confined to irrigated land only. Similarly, land renting was expected to have a 
negative effect on migration, because renting land reduces the labour available for 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis (n = 278).
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Dependent variables
Renting land (1=yes) 0.47 0.50 0 1
Migration (1=yes) 0.59 0.49 0 1
Independent variables
Household size (persons) 4.46 1.51 1 14
No. of dependants (persons) 1.27 1.11 0 4
No. of durable assets 6.39 1.84 1 11
No. of cattle 0.76 0.80 0 10
Age household head (years) 46.69 10.35 23 75
Age adults (years) 37.82 7.30 24.5 63
Education of household head (years) 4.80 2.78 0 13
Education adults (years) 4.35 1.66 0 10
Female–male adults ratio  1.02 0.57 0 4
Irrigated land per adult (mu) 1.94 0.93 0.25 9
Possession land contract (1=yes) 0.28 0.45 0 1
Land transfer rights 0.58 0.13 0 1
Social network (1=yes) 0.32 0.47 0 1
Banqiao dummy (1=yes) 0.17 0.38 0 1
Shangzhu dummy (1=yes) 0.33 0.47 0 1
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migration (Rozelle et al., 1999b; Kung & Lee, 2001; Kung, 2002; Shi et al., 2007). 
Deleting the households with missing information on one or more variables from our 
sample and leaving out the (few) households that both rented and leased land, the total 
number of observations used in the analysis was 278. Descriptive statistics of both 
dependent and explanatory variables are presented in Table 5. 
 The selected household characteristics (Zh) were household size, number of 
dependants in a household, ratio of female to male adults, and the number of durable 
assets. Number of dependants in a household was defined as the number of household 
members under 16 and over 66 years old, and durable assets included durable 
goods such as televisions, fridges, radios and transportation vehicles. Household 
characteristics have a direct effect on consumption preferences, and may have either 
positive or negative effects on the demand for leisure and consumption goods. It was 
expected that larger households and those with fewer dependants consume more food. 
If household decisions are non-separable, such households may increase agricultural 
production and therefore increase land renting and decrease migration.
 Fixed factors (Zq) were represented by the number of cattle in the household at the 
end of the previous year, the age of the household head (the average adult age), the 
education of the household head (the average adult education), and the ratio of female 
to male adults. Households that use cattle in agricultural production tend to rent 
more land and reduce migration, because with the draft power that they provide, they 
increase land and labour productivity. Renting land was expected to depend positively 
on the age and education of the household head, as households with an older and more 
educated head have more skills and experience and are more productive in agriculture. 
For the same reasons average adult age and education were expected to negatively 
influence migration. However, education can also play a role in getting access to the 
limited migration opportunities. Therefore, the impact of education on migration is 
ambiguous. The square of the age of the household head (the average adult age) was 
added to the equation to capture possible life-cycle effects. Females and males may 
differ in physical strength in agricultural production. A higher ratio of female to male 
adults was expected to have a negative effect on renting land and a positive effect on 
migration if males are more productive in agriculture.
 The household time endowment (L) was determined by its labour force size and 
so depends on household size and the number of dependants. In addition, it may also 
depend on the ratio of female to male adults, as taking care of children and doing 
housework are usually female tasks in Chinese society. Households with a relatively 
large time endowment were expected to rent more land and be more involved in 
migration. The household land endowment (A) was represented by the irrigated land 
contracted per adult. Households with relatively more land were expected to rent less 
land and participate less in migration. The square of this variable was added to the 
equation to capture possible nonlinearities in its impact. 
 Institutional factors affecting land renting and migration (Z) were represented by 
tenure security, transfer rights, and the presence of a social network. As mentioned 
earlier, since the end of the 1970s, China has implemented a fundamentally new 
land tenure system (the HRS). Farmland in China is legally owned by the village 
collective (the hamlet). Initially, the village collective (the hamlet) distributed land use 
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rights equally to individual households for a period of 15 years. In 1993, the Chinese 
government adopted a new policy, allowing land use rights to be extended for another 
30 years. On 1 January 1999, the Chinese government implemented the amended Land 
Administration Law (LAL). To guarantee long-term tenure security and encourage land-
attached investment, the amended LAL regulates that the village collective (the hamlet) 
should sign written land contracts with individual households and the duration of the 
land contract should be 30 years. The written contract should include the rights and 
responsibilities of both parties. Both parties’ rights to the contracted land are protected 
by the amended LAL. Even though the Chinese government has implemented 
uniform land laws and policies, different village collectives (hamlets) have their own 
land institutions, such as different rules in land distribution, land adjustment, and 
land transfer, different timing of implementing land laws and policies, and different 
durations of land contracts. During the survey households were asked whether they 
possessed a land contract, which was taken as an indication for tenure security. Tenure 
security was expected to stimulate land market participation (Lohmar, 1999; Lohmar 
et al., 2001; Kung, 2002). Secure tenure was also acknowledged as a major incentive to 
improve land-attached investment (Besley, 1995). Households with secure tenure may 
therefore spend more time on agriculture and have less labour available for migration. 
In the survey, households were also asked whether they had the right to transfer land 
within the village, the right to transfer land outside the village, inheritance rights or 
mortgage rights. The information was used to derive a land transfer right indicator, 
defined as the number of transfer rights enjoyed by the household, divided by four. A 
high value of the land transfer right indicator was expected to have a positive impact 
on land renting (Li & Yao, 2002). Land transfer rights may also promote land-attached 
investment (Carter & Yao, 1999), and therefore reduce migration, because households 
with more transfer rights are more likely to recoup the value of land investment if they 
should exit farming.
 Another institutional factor affecting land renting and migration is the presence 
of a social network. The presence of a social network may play an important role in 
participating in land renting and obtaining off-farm employment. A dummy variable 
was defined that equalled 1 if the household received remittances from family members 
who did not belong to the household or if the household had participated in migration 
before the survey year. Having a social network (previous migration experience may 
indicate experience in land rental transactions) may reduce transaction costs of finding 
partners in land rental agreements and of monitoring and enforcing these agreements, 
and was therefore expected to encourage land renting. The presence of a social network 
may help the household to find job information and initial accommodation in the 
migration destination and therefore will positively affect migration (Kung & Lee, 2001; 
Zhang & Li, 2003; Zhao, 2003). 
 Finally, the land rent (r) and wage rate (w) were assumed to be the same for 
all households living in the same village. Two dummy variables for Banqiao and 
Shangzhu village, reflecting these and other factors that systematically differed 
between the villages, were therefore added to the model.
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Results for land renting and migration
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit regression was used to examine whether 
participation in land renting and migration influence each other. To this end, some 
of the explanatory variables should differ between the land renting and migration 
equations. We assumed that land renting decisions are made in particular by the 
household head, whereas migration decisions are made jointly by all household 
members. As a consequence, we used the age and education of the household head to 
specify the land renting equation, and the average adult age and education to specify 
the migration equation. The results are presented in Table 6. 
Results for land renting 
As expected, the number of cattle in a household had a positive impact on the 
probability of renting land. The age of the household head showed an inverted U-
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Table 6. Determinants of land renting and migration − a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit regression (n = 278). 
Independent variable Land renting   Migration
 Coefficient 1 z-score  Coefficient 1 z-score 
Household size (persons) –0.05 –0.59  0.74 *** 5.47
No. of dependants (persons) 0.11  0.86   –0.67 *** –4.83 
Ratio female to male adults –0.16 –1.09  –0.09 –0.51
No. of durable assets 0.03  0.50  –0.14 ** –2.12 
No. of cattle 0.31 ** 2.28  –0.15 –1.12
Age household head (years) 0.15 ** 2.09
(Age household head)2 –0.002 ** –2.29
Adult age (years)    0.28 ** 2.55 
(Age adults)2    –0.004 *** –2.82 
Education household head (years) –0.05 –1.60
Education adults (years)    0.03 0.47
Irrigated land per adult (mu)  –0.16 –0.47  1.07 ** 2.38
(Irrigated land per adult)2 –0.03 –0.56  –0.22 ** –2.51 
Possession land contract (1=yes) 0.08  0.42  0.33 1.26
Land transfer rights 0.48 0.81  0.36 0.56
Social network (1=yes) –0.19 –1.07  0.96 *** 3.91
Banqiao dummy (1=yes) 0.31 1.33  –0.68 *** –2.50 
Shangzhu dummy (1=yes) 0.12 0.58  –0.57 ** –2.21 
Intercept –2.97 * –1.72  –7.44 *** –3.36 
Log pseudo likelihood   –289.83
rho   –0.35 (–2.80) ***
Wald test for rho = 0   χ2(1) = 7.83; P > χ2 = 0.005
1 * = P < 0.10; ** = P < 0.05; *** = P < 0.01. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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shaped relationship with households’ land renting decisions. The turning point 
was 43 years. This finding suggests that households with young heads as well as 
households with old heads are less likely to rent land than middle-aged heads. A 
possible explanation is that households with young heads have less farming skills 
whereas households with old heads have less physical strength; they are therefore 
less likely to rent land. The other variables did not have a significant impact on land 
renting. Also the joint significance of the institutional factors (possession of a land 
contract, land transfer rights and presence of a social network) was tested, and the 
result indicates that institutional variables had no significant impact on household land 
renting decisions. The same model was therefore estimated without these institutional 
variables. The results, which are not shown, differ only marginally and do not change 
the conclusions drawn for the other explanatory variables. 
Results for migration
The regression results indicate that household size had a positive impact on migration, 
whereas the number of dependants in a household had a negative effect. These 
findings confirm the results of earlier studies, which showed that larger households 
and households with fewer dependants tend to migrate (Zhao, 1997; 1999a, b; 2002; 
2003; Rozelle et al., 1999a, b; De Brauw et al., 2002). The number of durable assets 
owned by a household had a negative effect on migration, suggesting that richer 
households tended not to migrate. The average adult age showed an inverted U-shaped 
relationship with migration, supporting the findings of previous studies (Kung & Lee, 
2001; Zhang et al., 2002). The turning point was 37 years. 
 Interestingly, migration showed an inverted U-shaped relationship with land 
availability per adult. So households with low and households with high land 
availability are more likely to stay on the farm. This result is consistent with the 
finding of Li & Yao (2002) that land resources in rural China not only have a wealth 
effect, used for financing migration, but also a substitution effect that holds back 
migration when the land rental market is imperfect. So households with small land 
endowments may not be wealthy enough to be able to pay the transportation and other 
costs to migrate, whereas households with relatively large land endowments may have 
difficulties in leasing their land and therefore stay on the farm instead of migrating. 
The turning point was 2.38 mu. 
 As expected, having a social network positively affected migration. The other two 
institutional factors, possession of a land contract and land transfer rights, did not have 
a statistically significant effect on the probability of migration. Finally, the results for 
the two village dummy variables indicate that village-specific factors such as the wage 
rate and the land rent make households in Banqiao and Shangzhu village less likely to 
migrate than households in Gangyan village.
The inter-relationship between land renting and migration
After taking out the effects of the explanatory variables, the correlation coefficient 
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between the error terms of the two equations was –0.35, which is statistically significant 
(P < 0.01). This finding implies that there was a negative relationship between 
household land renting and migration decisions. So if the household is more likely to 
rent land, then the probability of migration is less and vice versa. This finding confirms 
the negative impact of migration on renting land found by both Yao (2000) and Kung 
(2002), who used village level instrumental variables to take into account the possible 
endogeneity of migration decisions. This finding also confirms the negative impact 
of renting land on migration found by Kung & Lee (2001) and Shi et al. (2007), who 
did not take into account the possible endogeneity of land rental market participation 
decisions.
Conclusions and policy implications
Economic reforms in rural China have led to the emergence of land and labour 
markets. Off-farm employment has become a significant phenomenon since the mid-
1980s. Recent studies also show a rapid increase in land rental transactions (Lohmar 
et al., 2001; Kung, 2002; Deininger & Jin, 2005). The fact that both land rental market 
participation and off-farm employment have been rising in recent years suggests 
that these two markets might be closely inter-related. Our study examined the factors 
determining households’ land renting and migration decisions, and investigated 
whether households’ land renting and migration decisions influence each other, using 
data from a survey among 329 farm households in three villages in Jiangxi Province, of 
which 278 households could be used for the analysis. A seemingly unrelated bivariate 
probit model was estimated to take into account the endogeneity problem of household 
land and labour market participation decisions and to examine the inter-relationship of 
household land renting and migration decisions.
 The empirical results show that the number of cattle in a household had a positive 
impact on the probability of renting land. The age of the household head showed an 
inverted U-shaped relationship with households’ land renting decisions, suggesting that 
households with young or old heads are less likely to rent land. A possible explanation 
is that households with young heads have less farming skill whereas households 
with old heads have less physical strength. Institutional variables played no role in 
household land renting decisions.
 The analysis also showed that a larger household size and a lower number of 
dependants had a positive impact on migration. The number of durable assets owned 
by a household had a negative effect on migration, suggesting that richer households 
tended not to migrate. The average adult age showed an inverted U-shaped relationship 
with migration, indicating that both young and old households tend to work and 
stay on the farm. Land availability also showed an inverted U-shaped relationship 
with migration. This finding indicates that households with small land endowments 
may not be wealthy enough to be able to migrate, whereas households with relatively 
large land endowments may have difficulties to lease their land in case of land rental 
market imperfections. Having a social network was found to have a positive effect on 
migration.
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The empirical evidence indicates that land renting and migration do influence each 
other. A negative relationship was found between land renting and migration. Given 
the prevalence of surplus labour and the great scarcity of agricultural land, this 
finding implies that creating more off-farm employment opportunities and improving 
the functioning of land rental markets are important mechanisms for increasing 
agricultural productivity and rural household incomes, particularly in poor areas. 
Policies aimed at building local institutions (e.g., rural credit, off-farm employment 
information offices, and land transaction offices) to facilitate land rental activities and 
improve access to available off-farm employment opportunities may therefore play an 
important role in improving efficiency in agricultural production.
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Appendix 1
Theoretical model of land and labour market participation
A theoretical model of household decision making can be developed to examine the determinants of land 
rental market participation and off-farm employment. Suppose the household is endowed with labour L,
cultivated land A, household characteristics Zh, and fixed factors Zq. Assume that the household does 
not hire additional labour (hiring of additional labour only takes place in peak seasons and is done in 
small quantities in the research area; it is therefore left out of our analysis), that the household can 
allocate its labour to agricultural production la, off-farm employment lo, or leisure l at a given wage w, 
and that the household can rent land Ain and lease land Aout at a given rent r. So the household can 
have income from on-farm agricultural production, off-farm employment and land rental activities. The 
household chooses la, lo, l, Ain and Aout to maximize utility:
  Max     U(y, l, Zh)      (1)
  la, lo, l
  Ain, Aout
Subject to:
  y = f(la, A, Zq) + wlo – (Ain – Aout)r     (2)
  la + lo + l = L       (3)
  A = A + Ain – Aout      (4)
  lo ≤ lo (Z)       (5)
  Aout ≤ Aout (Z)      (6)
  Ain ≤ Ain (Z)      (7)
  la, lo, l, Ain, Aout ≥ 0      (8)
where y is the household income; f(la, A, Zq) is the household agricultural production function that 
satisfies the standard assumptions; lo , Aout and Ain are the institutional constraints that limit 
household participation in the land and labour markets, where Z are the institutional factors, such as 
tenure security, transfer rights and having a social network that affect land rental market participation 
and off-farm employment. The price of the agricultural product is set at one; all other prices are 
expressed relative to this agricultural product price. 
 The Lagrangian of the utility maximization problem can be formulated as:
  L = U[f(la, A, Zq) + wlo – (Ain – Aout)r, l, Zh]    (9)
   + μo[lo – lo] + μAin[Ain    – Ain] + μAout[Aout – Aout]
where μo, μAin and μAout are the Lagrange multipliers for the constraints on lo, Ain and Aout.
 Household optimal labour allocation can be represented by the following first-order condition 
(Kuhn-Tucker condition):
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max
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max max max  
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362 NJAS 55-4, 2008
  ∂L/∂ lo = Uy(–fla + w) – μo ≤ 0      (10)
  lo ≥ 0 and lo* (Uy(–fla + w) – μo ) = 0
where superscript * indicates the optimum level.
 The first-order condition can be rearranged as (assuming an interior solution with lo > 0):
  fla = w – μo / Uy      (11)
 Equation 11 shows that the marginal value product of agricultural labour is smaller than the market 
wage rate when the off-farm employment constraint is binding. 
 Household optimal land allocation can be represented by the following first-order conditions:
  ∂L/∂Ain = Uy(fA – r) – μAin ≤ 0     (12)
  Ain ≥ 0 and Ain* (Uy(fA – r) – μAin ) = 0
  ∂L/∂Aout = Uy(–fA + r) – μAout ≤ 0     (13)
  Aout ≥ 0 and Aout*(Uy(–fA + r) – μAout ) = 0
 These first-order conditions can be rearranged as (assuming an interior solution for either Ain > 0 or 
Aout > 0):
  fA = r + μAin / Uy      (14)
  fA = r – μAout / Uy      (15)
 Either Equation 14 or Equation 15 holds (or neither holds). In other words, the household either 
rents land or leases land (or is self-sufficient in the land market). Equation 14 shows that the marginal 
value product of land is greater than the market land rent when the land renting constraint is binding, 
and Equation 15 states that the marginal value product of land is less than the market land rent when the 
land leasing constraint is binding.
 Based on these first-order conditions, the following reduced-form equations for land rental and off-
farm labour market participation can be derived:
  lo = lo (Zh, Zq, L , A , w, r, Z)     (16)
  Ain = Ain (Zh, Zq, L , A , w, r, Z)     (17)
  Aout = Aout (Zh, Zq, L , A , w, r, Z)     (18)
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